Abstract Although policymaking in response to the climate change threat is essentially a challenge of risk management, most studies of the relation of emissions targets to desired climate outcomes are either deterministic or subject to a limited representation of the underlying uncertainties. Monte Carlo simulation, applied to the MIT Integrated Global System Model (an integrated economic and earth system model of intermediate complexity), is used to analyze the uncertain outcomes that flow from a set of centuryscale emissions paths developed originally for a study by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program. The resulting uncertainty in temperature change and other impacts under these targets is used to illustrate three insights not obtainable from deterministic analyses: that the reduction of extreme temperature changes under emissions constraints is greater than the reduction in the median reduction; that the incremental gain from tighter constraints is not linear and depends on the target to be avoided; and that comparing median results across models can greatly understate the uncertainty in any single model.
Introduction
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) states its objective as: "…stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (UNFCCC 1992) , and discussion of such a long-term goal is a continuing focus of the Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Bali Action Plan (UN FCCC 2007) . This framing of the task has led to a focus on the calculation of the total emissions of CO 2 (or of all greenhouse gases stated in CO 2 -equivalents) that can be allowed over the century while maintaining a maximum atmospheric concentration.
In addition to objectives framed in terms of atmospheric concentrations, the climate goal also has been stated as a maximum increase, from human influence, to be allowed in global average temperature. For example, the European Union has adopted a limit of 2°C above the pre-industrial level, and in 2009 this 2°C target received an endorsement, if not a firm commitment, from the leaders of the G8 nations (G8 Summit 2009).
1 Because of the uncertainty in the temperature change projected to be caused by any path of global emissions, the policy goal is sometimes stated in terms of a maximum increase in radiative forcing by long-lived greenhouse gases, stated in watts per square meter (W/m 2 ). For example, this last approach was taken by a study of stabilization targets undertaken by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) (Clarke et al. 2007) , and a set of radiative forcing targets form the basis for construction of scenarios to be used in the IPCC's 5th Assessment Report (Moss et al. 2007) .
Though the climate policy challenge is essentially one of risk management, requiring an understanding of uncertainty, most analyses of the impacts of various policy targets have been deterministic, applying scenarios of emissions and reference (or at best median) values of parameters that represent aspects of climate system response, and the cost of emissions control. Examples of these types of studies as carried out by governmental bodies include the U.S. CCSP study mentioned above (Clarke et al. 2007 ) which applied three integrated assessment models to the study of four alternative stabilization levels, and the analysis of the cost of emissions targets in the IPCC's 4th Assessment Report (AR4) (Fisher et al. 2007 ). These efforts provide insight into the nature of the human-climate relationship, but they necessarily fail to represent the effects of uncertainty in emissions, or to reflect the interacting uncertainties in the natural cycles of CO 2 and other gases or the response of the climate system to these influences. Where efforts at uncertainty analysis have been madee.g., in the IPCC AR4 (Meehl et al. 2007 ) and other studies (e.g., Wigley et al. 2009 )-the results lack consideration of uncertainty in emissions and of some aspects of climate system response.
Here, seeking a more complete understanding of how emissions targets may reduce climate change risk, we quantify the distributions of selected climate outcomes, applying Monte Carlo methods to the MIT Integrated Global Systems Model (IGSM), an earth system model of intermediate complexity. This statistical approach cannot fully explore the extreme tails of the distribution of possible outcomes, and there are physical processes (e.g., rapid release of methane clathrates) that are too poorly understood to be included. The method can, however, provide a formal estimate of uncertainty given processes that can be modeled and whose input probability distributions are reasonably constrained. An advantage of the IGSM in this regard is that, in contrast to higher resolution but less flexible general circulation models, it can span the range of climate responses implied by the climate change observed during the 20th century.
The resulting uncertainty in temperature change and other climate impacts under these targets are used to illustrate three insights not obtainable from deterministic analyses. First, we show the degree to which the reduction of extreme temperature changes under emissions constraints exceeds the reduction in the median temperature change. Second, we demonstrate that the incremental reduction in the probability of exceeding a temperature target from tighter constraints is not linear and depends on the level of the target to be avoided. Third, we illustrate that comparing median results across models can greatly understate the uncertainty in any single model. The results here are a necessary first step towards an analysis of decisions under uncertainty, which is beyond the scope of this paper. We address this last issue further in the closing discussion.
Section 2 describes the greenhouse gas concentration stabilization policies to be simulated. We present the resulting distributions of model outcomes in Section 3. Section 4 compares these results with the outcome of studies with less-complete representations of uncertainty, to show the value of attempts to include a more-complete consideration of human and physical system uncertainties and their interactions. The final section discusses the implications of the long-term climate targets now under consideration in national discussions and international negotiations.
Analysis methods
We conduct the uncertainty analysis presented below by applying Monte Carlo simulation to the MIT IGSM Version 2 (Sokolov et al. 2005; . We have constructed probability distributions for the uncertain parameters in both the economic and the earth system components of the IGSM. Ensembles of 400 runs from these distributions are then sampled using Latin Hypercube Sampling (Rubenstein and Kroese 2008). For details on the IGSM, the basis for the probability distributions of parameters, and the sampling method, see the Supplemental Online Material (SOM).
We base the four stabilization scenarios on those developed, applying the MIT IGSM, for the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) Assessment Product 2.1A (Clarke et al. 2007 ). These cases were designed to provide insight into discussions of climate policy, particularly with regard to the implications of stabilization for emissions trajectories, energy systems, and mitigation cost. We build on that exercise by performing an uncertainty analysis of each of the CCSP policy constraints. Note that the IGSM simulation represents only the potential human perturbation of the climate system, as departures from any natural variability that may be experienced.
The stabilization scenarios in the CCSP exercise were labeled as Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4 (Clarke et al. 2007 ) and we retain those labels. Each of the emissions paths developed in the MIT component of the CCSP exercise is applied as a vector of constraints on global greenhouse gas emissions beginning in 2015. They are met in each simulated time period and so allow the same cumulative emissions from 2015 to 2100. The quantity that is held nearly constant under policy as parameters vary is the cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases, as weighted by 100-year Global Warming Potentials (GWPs).
2 When these emissions levels are propagated through an earth system model with different parameter values, the resulting concentrations will necessarily vary from these targets because earth system feedbacks on concentrations are themselves uncertain and depend on the realized climate. 3 For the policy constraints, we adopted the emissions paths from the CCSP study. Those paths were developed with the emissions price rising at 4% per year, a result consistent with efficient abatement over time (imposing "when" flexibility) for the scenarios in that study. Applied in this study, these constraints result in varying emissions price paths as a result of the varying parameters. In any period, "where" & "what" flexibility are achieved by allowing for emissions trading among regions and gases.
In Table 1 , we describe the no-policy and four stabilization scenarios in terms of their cumulative GWP-weighted emissions (denoted as CO 2 -equivalent (CO 2 -eq.) emissions) over 2001-2100, which are 2.3, 3.4, 4.5, and 5.4 trillion (10 12 or Tera) metric tons for Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The no-policy scenario has median cumulative emissions of 8.0 trillion metric tons. Table 1 also summarizes the ensemble results for the median levels of CO 2 concentrations; CO 2 -equivalent concentrations, calculated using radiative forcing due to long-lived greenhouse gases only (see SOM) relative to the pre-industrial level; change in total radiative forcing attributable to the long-lived greenhouse gases and tropospheric ozone and aerosols; and change in global mean surface temperature.
These calculated medians, stated in relation to the 1981-2009 average to be comparable with results in the IPCC AR4, can help inform policy discussions by giving some idea of the relations between emissions, concentrations and temperature increase. See SOM for the emissions of each greenhouse gas by scenario.
Results of the analysis

Uncertainty in climate under stabilization scenarios
Climate is defined as a decadal-average quantity and a comparison of temperature between any 2 years conflates climate change with inter-annual variability. Therefore we follow Sokolov et al. (2009) which examined the uncertainty in climate projections in the absence of climate policy reporting all results as decadal averages, for example using 2091-2100 to represent the end period of the simulation. The 21st century change is then expressed as the difference from the average for the period 1981-2000. The resulting distributions of outcomes are presented graphically as frequency distributions of the ensemble results. For each quantity, we choose a bin size such that roughly 50-80 bins are used, and then smooth the results over five-bin intervals. The specific bin size is given in the caption for each figure. The vertical coordinates are normalized so that the area under each distribution integrates to unity.
The uncertainty in greenhouse gas emissions under the five scenarios is described in Webster et al. (2008a) . Before describing the uncertainty in climate outcomes, we first show the path of the median emissions over time and the 5% and 95% bounds on emissions for total greenhouse gas emissions in CO 2 -eq. from that study (Fig. 1) . The no-policy case (black lines) has a large uncertainty range, while the policy cases do not exhibit uncertainty, because the emissions constraint is binding-i.e., for the four constraint cases the three lines are on top of one another because of this lack of uncertainty in total emissions. 4 There is some uncertainty in the emissions of individual greenhouse gases, such as CO 2 or CH 4 , because of variation in the relative costs of abatement of the different gases and trading among greenhouse gases is allowed using GWPs (see Webster et al. 2008a ).
In Fig. 2 , we show the uncertainty in total concentrations of the main long-lived greenhouse gases averaged for the decade 2091-2100, expressed as frequency distributions. We express the total greenhouse gas concentrations as CO 2 -eq concentrations-calculated as the CO 2 concentrations that would be needed to produce the same level of radiative forcing, relative to the pre-industrial level (see Huang et al. 2009 for more detail). The main features to note are that 1) the variance in concentrations is much greater when emissions are unconstrained, and 2) even under the four emissions constraints, some variance remains. The dominant source of uncertainty in concentrations in the simulations under emissions constraints is the rate of carbon uptake by the ocean and terrestrial ecosystems. 5 The resulting uncertainties in concentrations of individual greenhouse gases and in radiative forcing are given in the SOM.
The resulting uncertainty in global mean surface temperature change under each scenario is given in Fig. 3 as the frequency distribution of the difference between the average surface temperature for the period 2091-2100 and the average for the period 1981-2000 (see SOM for numerical values). The effect of the stabilization scenarios is to lower the entire distribution of future temperature change, including the mean, median, and all fractiles. The 95% bounds in the no-policy simulations are 3.3-8.2 o C (3.7-7.4 o C for climate-only 4 In fact, there is some uncertainty, too small to be seen in the figure, in the initial year of the Level 4 and Level 3 scenarios, because under the low-growth ensemble members the constraint is not binding. 5 As noted above, the IGSM considers uncertainty in carbon uptake by both ocean and terrestrial vegetation. The IGSM accounts for the effect of nitrogen limitation on terrestrial carbon uptake, this significantly reduces both strength of feedback between climate and carbon cycle and uncertainty in this feedback (Sokolov et al. 2008) . marginal damages as temperature increases (e.g., Schneider et al. 2007 ). While many estimates of the benefits of greenhouse gas control focus on reductions in temperature for a reference case that is similar to our median, these results illustrate that even relatively loose constraints on emissions reduce greatly the chance of an extreme temperature increase, which is associated with the greatest damage. Also, unlike the uncertainty in concentrations and radiative forcing, the uncertainty in temperature change, expressed as percent relative to the median, is only slightly less under the stabilization cases than under the no-policy case. For example, in the decade 2091-2100, the 95% range without policy goes from 40% below the median to 60% above, while the equivalent range under the Level 2 emission target is -33% to +44% of the median. Long term goals for climate policy are sometimes identified in terms of temperature targets. As illustrated by these calculations, a radiative forcing or temperature change target does not lead to an unambiguous emissions constraint because, for a given emissions constraint, the resulting temperature changes are still uncertain within this factor of 30 to 40%. Unclear in such statements regarding temperature targets is whether an emissions constraint set today should be based on the median climate response, or if the goal should be to avoid exceeding a target level of temperature change with a particular level of confidence. The emissions path would need to be much tighter, for example, if the goal was to reduce the probability of exceeding a temperature target to, say, less than one in ten or one in twenty.
The temperature change resulting from increasing greenhouse gases and other substances will not be uniform with latitude, with the change being greater at high latitudes and lesser in the tropics (Meehl et al. 2007) . As an example of the impact on high latitude temperature changes, we show the frequency distributions for 60 o N-90 o N (Fig. 4) . See SOM for more details. As can be seen from these results, climate policies have a larger effect on temperature changes at high latitudes than on global mean surface warming. The Level 4 policy scenario, for example, would reduce surface temperatures in high latitude regions by between 2 and 7 o C relative to the no-policy case or a 40% decrease, compared to a range of 1 to 3 o C or a 30% decrease in global mean surface warming. The MIT IGSM as applied here only simulates to 2100, although the inertia of the climate system causes the effects of emissions to be felt well beyond this time horizon. The results here can give a rough picture of the post-2100 climate outcomes by extrapolating the time trends (see SOM). In addition, this work could be complemented by running a reduced form model (e.g., Nordhaus 2007) over a longer horizon driven by the uncertain trends derived here.
Reduction of the probability of exceeding targets or critical levels
A critical insight from uncertainty analysis is that emissions control brings greater reduction in the tails of distributions than the median. And because there is evidence that marginal damages are increasing with the degree of climate change, targets are frequently stated in terms of conditions "not to be exceeded" as noted in Section 1. Thus a useful way to represent the results in Section 3.1 is in terms of the probability of achieving various targets. As one example, global mean surface temperature is often used as an indicator of climate change for this purpose, as it relates to impacts on human and natural systems. We show the probability of exceeding several illustrative targets for global mean temperature change (from 1981-2000 to 2091-2100) under the policy scenarios in Fig. 5 . For a very low temperature change target such as 2°C, the Level 4 and Level 3 cases decrease the probability only slightly. The Level 1 case reduces the probability of exceeding 2°C to about 25% or a 1 in 4 odds. In contrast, higher temperature change targets, such as 4°C, exhibit convexity; Levels 4 or 3 reduce the probability of exceedence significantly, with little incremental gain from more stringent reductions in the Level 2 and Level 1 cases. See The insight here is that the incremental reduction in risk from lower emissions depends on the target not to be exceeded. For a very extreme target (e.g., 6°C by 2100), the leftward shift the probability distribution of temperature change and the shrinking of the upper tail from even modest reduction may be sufficient to reduce the bulk of that risk. The gain from further reductions will decrease rapidly once the upper tail of the distribution is already mostly below the target. In contrast, much lower targets (e.g., 2°C by 2100) require extreme reductions in emissions before the bulk of the temperature change distribution falls below the target, resulting in the relatively concave relationship seen in Fig. 5 . The point is that one should not assume linear reductions in risk from increasing emissions mitigation.
Comparisons with other studies
Formal uncertainty analysis of the type shown here is computationally demanding, and as a result is infrequently conducted. Sometimes, however, assessments interpret the range of outcomes across models as a proxy for the uncertainty range, or include uncertainty in some but not all of the relevant processes. What is gained by the more complete representation of uncertainty in this paper can be shown in a comparison of our results with examples of other approaches.
One example is the CCSP study from which we drew the greenhouse gas constraints used in the IGSM calculations performed for that study and adopted here. The IGSM was one of three models used in the study; the other two were the MERGE and MiniCAM models (Clarke et al. 2007 ). These models have very different structures, and in the CCSP study no effort was made to calibrate them to common assumptions about economic growth, technology costs or other aspects of economic and emissions behavior. As a result of these inter-model differences, there was in the CCSP study, as in other multi-model assessments, the potential to take the difference in results among the model results as a measure of uncertainty-this despite warnings by the CCSP report's authors that such a procedure was inappropriate. Figure 6 shows why this warning was warranted and illustrates the limitations of multimodel assessments as a basis for forming judgments about uncertainty. For the reference and each constraint, Level 1 through Level 4, it shows the probability distributions of CO 2 concentrations in 2091-2100. Also shown in Fig. 6 are five horizontal lines with black circles indicating the range of point estimates from the different models in Clarke et al. (2007) for the particular policy scenario. For the IGSM, the reference case used in the CCSP study is below the median in the current calculations, in part because of model changes since the earlier analysis was done. But what is important for this comparison is the magnitude in estimated uncertainty between the two approaches. In all cases, the range of model point estimates is much narrower than the uncertainty range-indeed, less than 50% of the range calculated for the IGSM alone. Another example of partial uncertainty analysis is the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), which presented probability bounds on some of its projections, conditional on each of several different SRES emission scenarios (Nakicenovic et al. 2000) . These scenarios together with the 90% range of results from the IPCC AR4 AOGCMs (where available), and the distribution of temperature change from our simulations, are shown in Fig. 7 . This comparison suggests that the IPCC projections significantly underestimate the risks of climate change in the absence of an emissions constraint. The significantly larger chance of greater climate change in this study than in the IPCC is due to both the emissions scenarios and the climate response. Detailed comparisons of emissions for the IPCC SRES scenarios with the emissions used in this study can be found in Prinn et al. (2011) and Webster et al. (2008a) . As noted by Webster et al. (2008a) only the A1FI and A2 scenarios fall within the uncertainty range for our no-policy case. Given our analysis, the other SRES scenarios are unlikely absent the influence of climate policy. It has been widely observed that the SRES scenarios, originally constructed in the mid-1990s, underestimated emissions trends of the last 10 to 15 years and are well-below observed emissions today (Canadell et al. 2007; Pielke et al. 2008) .
As can be seen from Fig. 7 , the "likely", 7 ranges given by the IPCC AR4 are significantly wider than both 90% ranges in the simulations with the MIT IGSM and the 90% probability ranges based on the simulations with the AR4 AOGCMs. Meehl et al. (2007) construct a "likely" range for temperature change of 40% below the best estimate to 60% above the best estimate, with the best estimate being a mean value of surface warming projected by the AOGCMs. The long upper tail of the "likely" range is explained, in part, by the possibility of a strong positive feedback between climate and the carbon cycle (Knutti et al. 2008 ). As mentioned above, taking into account the nitrogen limitation on terrestrial carbon uptake makes this feedback much weaker (Sokolov et al. 2008) . However, as noted earlier, ocean data and other aspects of the analysis, if varied, produce a different range, and so a meta-analysis across these different data sources and approaches would yield still greater uncertainty. A detailed comparison between our no-policy case and the IPCC AR4 results is given by Sokolov et al. (2009) . (Meehl et al. 2007) and from this analysis. The grey bars for IPCC results indicate the "likely" range (between 66% and 90% probability), and solid black line indicates the 5-95% range of AOGCM results (only provided for B1, A1B, and A2). Results from this analysis are shown as box plots, where box indicates the 50% range and center line is median, outer whiskers indicate the 10-90% range, and the dots indicate the 5-95% range Currently, a new round of scenario analyses is underway that would provide for a common basis for climate model runs in the IPCC AR5. Guidance for those scenarios is provided in Moss et al. (2008) . Four Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) are being prepared, which are described as: "one high pathway for which radiative forcing reaches>8.5 W/m 2 by 2100 and continues to rise for some amount of time; two intermediate "stabilization pathways" in which radiative forcing is stabilized at approximately 6 W/m 2 and 4.5 W/m 2 after 2100; and one pathway where radiative forcing peaks at approximately 3 W/m 2 before 2100 and then declines." The radiative forcing increase in the RCPs is specified from the preindustrial level. All RCP pathways reflect cases in the published literature with the first three based on the CCSP scenarios. Thus, not coincidentally, the analysis reported here is approximately consistent with the RCP scenarios. In particular, the median of our no-policy case (see Table 1 )-when corrected to a change from pre-industrial by the addition of an estimated of 1.8 W/m 2 increase 8 -is consistent with the "high and rising" RCP, while our Level 2 (3.5+1.8=5.3 W/m 2 above preindustrial by 2100) and Level 1 (2.4+1.8=4.2 W/m 2 ) are roughly consistent with achieving stabilization sometime after 2100 at 6.0 and 4.5 W/m 2 respectively. 9 The analysis presented here thus may provide an assessment of uncertainty to complement the scenario analysis being developed for the IPCC AR-5.
Discussion
Deciding a response to the climate threat is a challenge of risk management, where choices about emissions mitigation must be made in the face of a cascade of uncertainties: the emissions if no action is taken (and thus the cost of any level of control), the response of the climate system to various levels of control, and the social and environmental consequences of the change that may come. In policy deliberations, analysis of the very complex issues of climate change effects frequently is put aside, to be replaced with a global target intended to avoid "danger"-stated, depending on the context, in terms of a maximum allowable global temperature change, a maximum allowable increase in radiative forcing, or a maximum total of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases over some long run period, usually a century. And, usually, the relationship between these different measures is expressed without representing the uncertainty among them, stating uncontrolled emissions in the form of a set of scenarios and representing climate processes in the form of single "reference" or median values. For example, a widely-held position in climate discussions is that limiting atmospheric concentrations of CO 2 to 450 ppm (or 550 ppm CO 2 -eq) will achieve the target of a maximum of 2 o C temperature increase from the pre-industrial level. Major issues of international negotiation, and potential economic cost, attend these relationships, and it should be helpful to international discussions to have an analysis of the likelihood that this relationship holds true, Here we have provided such an analysis, and the impression of the effectiveness of commonly-discussed emissions limits can look very different when this human-climate system is subjected to a rigorous uncertainty analysis. 8 Our estimate of 1.8 W/m 2 is derived from the GISS model (Hansen et al., 1988) , the radiation code from which is used in the MIT IGSM. The IPCC estimates the change in radiative forcing from preindustrial to present to be 1.6 W/m 2 , based on their estimates of the forcing from individual GHGs (Forster et al., 2007) . 9 We do not have a case comparable to the 3 W/m 2 as that was not in the CCSP scenario design, and presents considerable challenges in simulating as it requires the assumption of energy technologies with net negative emissions.
Several qualifications about these results are worth mentioning. The resulting uncertainties presented are conditional on the structural formulations of the MIT IGSM. Distributions from other models, while likely different, would be similarly conditional. Also, there are sources of uncertainty that are not treated here because of our current inability to represent the relevant processes in a systematic and efficient fashion. Additionally, the climate uncertainties presented here result from known or expected sources of parametric uncertainty, and do not account for unanticipated changes or shocks to the system that may occur. Also, as noted above, our projections of the climate response to human forcing are conditional on the estimated joint distribution of input parameters based on 20th century data series, importantly including a series for changes in the heat content of the deep ocean. On the economic and technological uncertainties, we necessarily rely on expert judgment because future changes in social systems will not necessarily resemble past events, despite the known cognitive biases in human judgment of uncertainty. The only alternative to expert judgment for these quantities would be to ignore the uncertainty and pretend that a reference value (itself based on expert judgment) is sufficient.
Of course, analyses focused on long-term emissions targets give only a partial picture of the decision problem that nations face. A more complete framing would consider the possibility of learning and revision of targets over time (e.g., Webster et al. 2008b; Yohe et al. 2004; Kolstad 1996) . Emissions goals agreed in the next decade or two can and likely will be revised as new information comes to light. The analysis here is a necessary first step towards explicitly considering decision under uncertainty. The main contribution of this analysis is to refocus the debate away from the illusion of deterministic choices towards a risk management perspective.
